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No. 4

IMPLIED POWERS OF AGENT FOR SALE OF
LAND
§ I. WHAT HERE. INCLUDED.-It 'will be borne in mind
that the
question here to be considered is not in what form or in
what manner
authority to sell land may be conferred, e. g., whether
it must be by
writing or may be by word or act, but whether an authority
properly
created and unquestionably existing for some purpose
will include
this one, whether authority unquestionably relating
in some form
to land confers authority to sell it, and whether an authority
clearly
authorizing a sale of land confers authority to do some
other act
relating to it.
So far as form is concerned, it will be recalled that parol
authorization ordinarily suffices for a mere broker; usually but
not universally written authority is requisite for a binding contract
to sell; while
authority under seal is usually requisite for the execution
of instruments necessarily under seal, as usually in the case
of deeds of
conveyance of land.
§ 2.
. AUTHORITY TO SELL RATHER THAN MERELY
TO FIND
A PURCHASER-MERE BROKER No AUTHORITY TO MAKE
A BINDING
CONTRACT.-It is to be noted also that the case here
contemplated
is that in which the agent is really authorized to sell
and not merelyemployed to find a purchaser to whom the principal
may selh The
distinction is one of .consequence because one employed
as a mere
real estate broker to "sell" land, even though employed
by writing, is
usually held to have no power to make a binding contract,
but is
confined to the finding of a person ready, willing and
able to buy
from the principal on the terms proposed by. him.' The
cases- taking
'Carstens'v. McReavy, r Wash. 359. 25 Pac. 47x; McReavy v. Eshelman,
4 Wash..

757, 3r Pac. 3S; Armstrong v. Oakley. 23 Wash. 122.
62 Pac. 499 (see also Scully v.
Book, 3 Wash. 182. 28 Pac. sS6); Donnan v. Adams, 3o
Tex. Civ. App. 6zS, 71 S. W.
s8o; Dickinson v. Updike (N. J.) 49 AtI. 712; Stengel
v.
Atl. xso6; Scull v. Brinton. ss N. J. Eq. 489. 37 Atl. 740; Sergeant, 74 N. J. Eq. 20, 68
O'Reilly v. Keim. 54 N. J. Eq.
418, 34 Ati. 1o3; Tyrrell v. O'Connor, 56 N. 3. Eq. 448,
41 At]. 674; Morris v. Ruddy,
20 N.J. Eq. 236; McCullough v. Hitchcock,
71 Conn. 401. 42 Atl. 81 ; Armstrong v. Lowe,
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under-.
this view proceed upon the theory that the character of the
presumptively
and
known,
well
is
broker
estate
real
the
of
taking
as a negotiator
his employment, though by writing, is in his -capacity
inwriting.'
merely and not as an agent to close a contract
MAKZ A BiNDiMG CONTRACT
. BuT AuTHoRiTY 4
§, 3. if it be conceded that the
even
xisT.---But
MAY BX VouND To

confer upon him
mere employment of a real estate broker does not
the language
the power to make a binding contract, it is still true that
as to show
such
be
employed or the circumstances of sthe case may
request to
mere
a
course
Of
that such a power was intended
purchaser,'
a
find
to
endeavor
to
"list" property,' a mere request
mere stating of
mere inquiries as to the possibility of a sale, the
*z8. s4 Pae. 89o; Lambert-v. Garmer,
76 Cal. 6z6. IS Pac. 758; Grant v. Zde,.8s Cal.
9 N. D. 28s, 83 N. W. 10; Brandrup
Bergvendsen.
v.
Balton
42 Cal 3. ,6 PAZ. s3;
v. Galloway. 148 IniL 440, 47 N. B.
Campbell
4S3;
W.
N.
92
v. Britte= xx N. D. 376.'
v. Searle, zz6 Is. 374. 89 N. W.
Balkema
857";
W.
N.
6z
300.
12.
93
8W8; Furst v. Tweed.
v. KIrzmner, 88 Va. 411,
Simmons
238;
Z.
S.
24
$81,
Vs.
92
Monteiro,
xo87; Halsey v.
Y. Moore. 61 ,'J.
Cfasdburn
9t4;
.
S.
13
4S6.
Va.
88
Blair.
v.
13 S. B. 002; Kramer
2r Barb. (N. Y.)
Luther.
v.
Glentworth
39;
Rep.
WkdY.
41
2s7.
S.)
Ch. 674, 67 I, T. (N.
section.
following
to
note
first
in
cited
cases
z4., Contra: Compare
Conn. 4oil. 42 AtL 8z; Halsey Y. Monteir
4 Thus in McCullough v. Hitchcock. 7z cases, in piactically Identical language, it is
92 Va. 8z. 24 S. X. S8. and many other
negotiates the sales of real property.
asid: "A real estate broker or'agent is one who
purchaser who is willing to buy the
His business. generally speaking. is onlSy to find a
authority to bind hii principal by
land upon the terms fixed by the owner. He has no
involves the adjustment of many matters,
signing a contract of sale. A sale of real estate
enally the
has to be sfttled;
besides fixing the price. The delivery of the possession
its covenants is to be agreed upon and
title has to be examined. and the conveyance with
and time for completion.
executed by the owner. All of these things require conferences
do not pertain to the duties and are
These ate for the determination of the owner, and
these obvious reasons, and others
not within the authority of a real estate agent. For
of the law which withholds from such
which might be suggested, it is a wise provision
sign a contract of sale in behalf of
agent as we tlink it does, any implied authority to
his wrincipal."
the whole property is not a
One of several tenants in common authorized to sell
Co. v. Mead. - Vt. -. So
Marble
Vermont
rule:
this
of
broker within the meaning
AtI. 8Sx.
S2, 26
Mi.
3 See Pringle v. Spaulding, 53 Barb. (N. Y.) 17; Jackson v. Badger, 35
86 Mo. 178; Glass v. Rowe.
N. W. 9o8; Stewart v. WoOd, 63 Mo. 2SQ; Smith v. Allen.
42S. 66 N. W. 8a; Colvin v.
103 Mo. 513, IS S. W. 340; Farrell v. Xdwards. 8 S. D.
Civ. App. --. 13Z
Blanchard. oz Tex. 231 o6 S. W.. 3; Donnell i. Currie. - Tex.
N. Y. 363.
S. W. 88; Peabody v. Hoard. 46 IIl. 20; Haydock v. Stow. 4o
. 258. a letter from the owner telling
4 In Halsey v. Monteiro. 92 Va. S8z, 24 S.
that .he would take so much
the broker to list it for twelve months on certain terms or
the owner by contract.
'cash, was held not to suggest an authorization to bind
W. I0; and Brandrup v.
See also Ballou v. Bergvendsen. 9 N. Dak. 28S. 83 N.
used .was "I hereby grant
Britten. xx k. Dae. 376. 9i N. W. 453 (where the language
etc).
to [the agent] the sale of the following described property."
language was leld in51n McCullouvh v. Hitchcock. 71 Conn. 4o2, 42 AtL Sr. this
I do not
like to sell. *
would
I
lot
building
a
have
"I
sale.
authorize.&
to
sufficient
give me an idea of its
know te value .of said lot. but could you not look at the lot ind
value and if possible find a purchaser for same."
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0
terms upon which the owner would be willing to sell, and the like,
will not of themselves constitute an authority to sell. It is, how-

ever, entirely clear that the correspondence or negotiations between
the parties may.be such as to create the authority to make a binding
contract to sell.7 It is not necessary that any particular pbraseology
s In Watkins Land Mortgage Co. v. Campbell, zoo Tex. s42, zoi S. W. so78, real
estate brokerq submitted to their principal an offer they had received for his property
and said: "Shall we close the deal?" The principal replied that if the brokers could get
the cash payment increased "we would be willing to accept the offer. * * * Awaiting
your further report we are. etc." Held, not to authorize the making of a binding contract. So in Simmons v. Kramer, 88 Va. 41:, 13 S. E. 902, the broker wrote to his principal
reporting an offer; the principal replied that he would not accept the offer but stated the
price and terms at which he would be willing to sell concluding thus: "Will give you
2% commission awaiting a reply." Held, not to be sufficient to justify th making of a
contract.
See also Lamberv v. Geiner, 142 Cal. 399, 76 Pac. 53; Armstrong v. Oakley, 23 Wash.
122, 62 Pac. 499 (where a letter of the owner was held to merely express the terms
upon which the owner would be willing to enter'into a contract with a purchaser); Kramer
v. Blair. 88 Va. 456, 13 S. E, 914; Campbell v. Galloway, 148 Ind. 440, 47 N. E. 818.
An attorney wrote asking the defendant if he would accept $35o for certain piece of
property. Defendant telegraphed that he would take $45o, whereupon the attorney sold
the property for $5oo and converted it to his own use. On suit by purchaser for
specific performance it was healhctat the correspondence did not amount to an authorization to sell. Prentiss v. Nels~n, 69 Minn. 496, 7a N. W. 831.
In answer to a letter inquiring at what price the defendant would sell, written by
or $4100 cash is the
real estate brokers, the defendant replied, "$4200 on time
lowest price I will take." Brokers sold on terms given and it wab held that the sale
was unwarranted, the correspondence having amounted only to an offer. Jahn v. Kelly, 58
IL. App. 57o.
In Donnan v. Adams. 3o Tex. Civ. App. 615, 71 S. W. S8o, it was held that a
memorandum containing description and price executed and signed by the owner and
accompanied by oral instruction to sell did not constitute an authority in the agent to
make a contract binding the principal.
In Sullivan v. Leer, 2 Colo. App. 141 it was held that following correspondence under
the circumstances did not constitute a power to sell. March 30, 1889, defendant Wrote
the agent "I will be in Denver last of April-wish you would have a purchaser, think
I ought to get $17000 for the house." April 2oth agent telegraphed: "Lot sold for
$z6.ooo cash." Owner replied Apil 24th: "Won't selL for less than $17,ooo-be there
On May 3rd, the day of the defendai's Arfival in Denver, the agent teleMay 'st."
graphed: "Sold property, $17,ooo."
In Jackson v. Badger, 35 Minn. S2, a6 N. W. 908, a letter reading, "You may sell
my 4o acres. $2.ooo hand money, and the balance in three years with interest," was
held to authorize a binding contract though not sufficient to authorize a conveyance.
In Stewart v. Wood. 63 Mo. 252, it was held that this language in a letter conferred
power to make a binding contract: "Sell my farm for me at ten dollars per acre, or
as much more as you can get."
In Smith v. Allen, 86 Mo. 178. the defend-nt residing in Chiago, wrote to W. a
real estate agent in Kansas City, in response to an inquiry about the selling of defendant's property in Kansas City, in the following terms: "I am sick and not able to write;
will leave the sale of the lots pretty much- with you; if the party or anyone is
* *I
willing to pay. * * * I think I am willing to -have you make out a deed and I will
perfect it. * * * If you think I better try the spring market, hold till then." W showed
this letter to the plaintiffs, executed a contract of sale and received earnest money.
W then wrote defendant that he had sold on the terms submitted, "subject to your
apprpval." And in subsequent correspondence, it appeared that W through misapprehension or equivocation, led his principal, the defendant, to believe he had not made a binding
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be used, or that the authorization be in -any formal terms.. The
question is, does the language used sufficiently indicate that the
party is authorized to close a binding contract of sale? This may
be merely a question of the construction of the words used, or it
may be an inference of fact as to intention to be decided like other
similar questions. Naturally enough as in other similar cases different courts may draw different inferences from substantially
similar facts, and many instances are to be found of apparently
irreconcilable conclusions although the courts purported to apply
the same principles. It is not to be denied, however, that there are
some cases in which the courts have proceeded upon wholly irreconcilable theories and of course have reached conflicting results. 8 Thus
in a few cases express authority to sell even though "aU the terms
contract. It was held that the defendant's letter was a sufficient authorization -to the
agent to bind his principal and that the letters thereafter did not explain the meaning
of the authority but indicated merely the opinions of the writers, as to the consequences
of their act.
In Glass v. Rowe. X03 Mo. 515, IS S. W. 334. a letter in these words was held
to confer a power to bind the principal by contract-the letter was from a non-resident
owner to a local real estate agent: "Will now sell $3o per foot. A regular commission
of two and a half per cent to you after sale is made and closed. Terms, * *...
In Farrell v. Edwards, 8 S. 3). 475, 66 N. W. 8r2, there was a series of communications between the owner and a real estate dealer resulting in a sale by contract made
by the agent. It was held that the iuthority'was contained in two letters, the substantial
portions of which are as follows: "If you find a buyer, you can fix up the papers at
any of the banks. I want 3oo down, and my share of the crop; balance,'goo, at 8
per cent." and "if you make the deal. you better write me before making out the papers
to send to me to sign." The court also relied upon a ratification.
In Colvin v. Blanchard, ox Tex. 231, xo6 S. W. 323, the principal wrote to a firm
of real estate dealers in whose hands the property had been placed for sale: "I wil sell
the Iota for Sxg.ooo and pay you a s per cent com. plus $so, or Sx,ooo com.
ig all for making the sale.
*. Terms. $3.000 cash. bal. long time." The agents in
pursuance of this letter made a contract. It was held that the letter conferred a power
to contract. There was evidence of subsequent assent on part of the seller but as
matter of ratification it was not noted by the courts.
See also Donnell v. Currie, - Tex. Civ. App. -, 13I S. W. 88.
o Thus for example an undoubted majority of the cotrts generally following the case
of Duffy v. Hobson, 40 Cal. 240, 6 Am. Rep. 6x7, have put such a construction upon
the employmelt of the ordinary real estate broker as to exclude his authority to make
a binding contract unless there be something in the case to alter the ordinary presumption.
(See also Arntrong v..Lowe, 76 Cal. 616, 18 Pan. 7s8; Grant v. -de, 8S Cal. 418, 24
Par. 89o; Lambert v. Gerner, 142 Cal. 399, 76 Pac. 53.)
McCullough v. Hitchcock. 7! Conn. 401. 42 AtL 8t; Buckiigham v. Harris, io
Colo. 45S. is Pac. 817; Ryon v. McGee, a Mack; (D. C.) 17; Mannix v. Eildreth. a
App. Cas. D. C. aS9; Jones v. Holladay, a App. Cas. D. C. a79; Balkema v. Searle, z16
Iowa 374, 89 N. W. o87; Campbell v. Galloway. 148 Ind. 440. 47 N. I. 8X8; Milne v.
Kleb. 44 N. 3. Fq. 378..14 At. 646; Lindley v. Keim, 54 X. I. Zq. 418, 34AtL o73;
Dickinson v. Updike (N. J. Eq.) 49 At. 71a; Scull v. Brinton. SS N. 3. Eq. 489.
37 At. 74o; Tyrrell v. O'Connor, 56 N. . q. 448, 41 At. 674; Balinu Y. Bergvendsen,
9 N. Dakc. 28s. 83 N. W. so; Donnan v. Adams, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 6xS, 71 S. W. S8o;
Halsey v. Monteiro. 9a Vs. s81. 24 S. . aS8; Carstens v. McReavy, z Wash. 359, &S
Pac. 471; Baroes v. Germ'an Say. Soc. 21 Wash. 448, S8 Pac. 569; Armstrong v. Oakley,
23 Wash. 122, 62 Pac. 499.
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were specified has been held to be a mere authority to "sell" as a
broker, that is, to find a purchaser but not to close a binding contract
with him.9
In all cases .of this sort in which written authority is requisite to
justify a contract of sale, the person dealing" with the agent, is, in
contemplation of law, charged with knowledge of that fact and.
deals with the agent's credentials before him.10 These agents, moreover, are usually special agents, and their authority is to be deemed
to be strictly limited to that which is either expressly given or necessarily implied."'
§ 4. MERE PREIIMINARY CORRESPONDENCE OR NEGOTIATION NOT
obvious also that before the
questions here suggested can be determined, the authority intended
to be conferred must be completely agreed upon and vested. If,
-therefore, the dealings between the principal and the agent have not
passed beyond the stage of preliminary correspondence, if the terms
upon which the authority is to be executed or the property sold are
not yet fully determined, if further communications are to be had
with the principal or further assent given before the authority is to
be exercised,' 2 and the like, there can ordinarily be no present author3
ity to sell in such wise as to bind the principal.
ENOUGH TO CONFER AUTHORITY.-It is

. 9In Armstrong v. Lowe, 76 Cal. 6x6, 18 Pac. 758. the defendant employed a firm of
real estate agents to sell property and made 9nd delivered to them this memorandum:
"You are hereby authorized to sell my property and to receive deposit on the same.
for the sum of two hundred dollars per acre, cash. I hereby agree to
situated "
pay you the sum of five per cent for your services in case you effect a sale or find a
purchaser for the same. or will pay you two and one-half per cent of above commission
should I sell the same myself or through another agent." Held, that this writing did not
authorize the making of a binding contract.
On the other hand, in Haydock v. Stow, 4o N. Y. 363, a writing in language almost
identical was held to confer a power to make a contract. "I hereby authorize and empower Peck, Hellman and Parks, agents for me. to sell the following described property
[description and terms]."
See also Jackson v. Badger, 35 Minn. 52, a6 N. W. 9o.
19Schaeffer v. Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co., 38 Mont. 459, ZOOPac. 22S; Miller v. Wehr455.
man, 81 Neb. 388, xiS N. )V. 1078; Rawson v. Curtiss, 19 Ill.
"-Schaeffer v. Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co.. supra; Moore v. Skyles, 33 Mont. 135, 82
Pac. 799, z44 Am. St. Rep. 8o; 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 136; Brown v. Grady, x6 Wyo. xS,
92 Pac. 622.
"2As for example, where the principal's approval is to be given before the sale-is
made: Burlington. etc.. R. Co. v. Sherwood, 62 Iowa 309. 17 N: W. g64; Alcorn v.
Buschke, 133 Cal. 6SS, 66 Pac. xS; Johnson v. American Freehold I.. Mtg. Co., :zz Ga.
490, 36 S.E. 614.
In Furst v. Tweed. 93 Iowa 3o0, 62 N. W. 857. the principal wrote saying that
he asked a certain sum; that he would sell "on almost any terms to suit purchaser," and
"if you succeed in selling. I am willing to allow you" a certais commission. Held,
that the language used respecting the terms indicated that this matter was to be referred
to 14m, and that the agent had no authority to close a binding contract.
In Balkema v. Searle, zx6 Iovqa 374, 89 N. W. :e87, there was correspondence stating
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§ 5. CONDITIONAL AUTHORTY.-The authority may; of course,
be a qualified or conditional one. As long as the conditions or
limitations are lawful, there is no reason why the principal may not
limit or qualify the authority to any extent Which suits his pleasure.
Such limitations or conditions, unless waived, will be operative
against the agent and also against third persons who have, or are
charged with, notice of them. The authority may thus bd limited as
to time, price, subject matter, terms, and the like, and many illustrations of such limitations will be found in the following sections. It
may also require the principal's approval before a particular execution shall be deemed authorized.1 '
terms, part cash. "balance given on time." but the time was not stited. The court
said: "In the corresponden
.some matters were left indefinite, to be settled by defendant, doubtless, when the purchase. aspeared." Hl, tht
agt
had no authofif to
make a binding contract.
In Grant v. de. 8s Cal. 418. 24 Pac. 890, where the ownrs wrote. "we will sell"
at a certain price at any time before a given date, the court said that the aent was not
thereby authorized to sell, and in any event material terms were not ggreed upon. e. g.,
the form of deed. the time of payment, and tle time of delivery of possessioa.
See. for example. Stewart v. Pickering, 73 Iowa 6so. 3S N. W. 6"o. In this cae
the defendants, land brokers in Iowa. wrote to the plaintiff's attorney in fact: "Do you
have charge of the lands in this county belonging to the estate of S? If so. are they
for sale? * * * If the title is all right, we can possibly find a customer for the lit this
year. Let us hear from you as to prices. etc." The reply thereto was as fellows: "I
herewith inclose you a price-list of our lands in your county. My mother is the widow
of S. and is the sole devisee by will which is recorded in your county. I am executor
of my father, and attorney in fact of my mother. The titles are all strictly clear and
good." Attached to this letter was the following: "Western land for sale, Winnebago
courtT. Iowa." [Here followed a list of the land with the prices.] "Apply to D. S.,
Falls City. Pa.. etc Terms V, down, balance in 4 equal- annual payments, with S per
cent interest." etc. Held, that this correspondence gave no authority to the defendants
to bind the owner by a sale at the prices named, but was at most an authority to sell
only subject to her apprdval or that of her attorney in fact.
See also Stillman v. Fitzgerald, 37 Minn 185, 3 N. W. s64, where a firm of real
estate brokers wrote to the defendant saying: "We have a customer [mnin the plaintiff] who would buy your lot if offered at a fair price," and asking him to state'bst
price and the terms, for which he would sell, and pay their commission, which was 4tatqd
The defendant answered by letter stating price, and, in part only, the terms, for which
he would sell, and that he would pay their commission. It was held that the brokers were
not thrreby constituted the defendant's agents, with a power to bind him by a contract
of sale.
A letter written by the, owner of land to a real estate agent stating that he had
received the agent's letter in regard to a prospective sale, giving the pfice at which he
hoped to sell. asking for full information, and as to when the deed should he made out
and requesting that a blank form of deed be sent to him with the name and resldince
of thepurchaser. does not furnish any evidence that the.agent had authority to mae
a binding contract to sell the property; Smith v. ?prowne. 132 N. C.'36S, 43
91 3.SAn owner wrote in reply to a broker's request for a price that he'would take $rooo,
and, if the" broker could sell or rent it, the owner would do right by him. "Thi agest
made the.al , and further .correspoddence followed iihic. showed that the agent at least
dUinot regsrd the letter mentioned as constituting a power and it. was held that there had
been no authorization. Riley v. Grant, z6"S. .I)
SS3, 94 N. W. 427.
4 See Alcorn v,.Bliache, 133 CaL 6SS. 66 PA-- kS.
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§ 6.

AUTHORITY TO SELL LAND NOT OPDIN.ARILY To BE INFERRED
FROM MERE GENERAL AUTHORITY Tro Ac.-Authority to sell real

estate must ordinarily be conferred in clear and direct language; for,
although there are cases in which it may arise by implication," it is
not lightly to be inferred from express power to do other acts or
brought withiri the operation of mere general terms. A'power of
attorney, therefore, "to act in all my business, in all concerns, as
if I were present, and to stand good in law, in all my land and other
business," gives no power to sell land ;2. nor does a power "to ask,
demand, recover or receive the maker's lawful share of a decedent's
estate, giving and granting to his said attorney his sole and full
power and authority to take, pursue and follow such legal course for
the recovery, receiving and obtaining the same as he himself might
or could do were he personally present; and upon the receipt thereof,
acquittances and other sufficient discharges for him and in his name
to sign, seal and deliver;7" nor does a power "to make contracts,
to settle outstanding debts and generally to do all things that concern my interest in any way real or personal, whatsoever, giving
others or
my said attorney full power to use my name to release
s
bind myself, as he may deem proper and expedient;"' nor does. a
power "to attend to the business of the principal generally," or "to
act for him with reference to all his business;"9 nor does authority
to.locate 21and survey land ;20 nor does a power to sell "claims" and
"ieffects."

u Comyns. Dig. VII Polar, A 2. declares. "So. if a man expresses the power only
by implication, it is well; as, provided that he shall not have power to alien, etc., otherwise
than to make a jointure, and leases for 21 years; it is a good power to make a jointure
and leases. I Leo. 148." See also Marr v. Given, 23 Me. SS, 39 Am. Dec. 6oo.
Compare Bosseau v. O'Brien, 4 Biss. (U. S.) 395.
u Ashley v. Bird, I Mo. 44o, 14 Am. Dec. 3r3.
IL'Hay v. Mayer. 8 Watts (Penn.) 203. 34 Am. Dec. 453. A power of attorney "to
ask, demand and receive of and from any person or persons all such real and personal
estate as I.may be entitled to by virtue of my being a son and heir at law of" a
named person does not authorize the attorney to sell and convey the principal's real
estate: Hotchkiss v. Middlekauf, 96 Va. 649. 32 S. E. 36. See also Bean v. Bennett.
-s Tex. Civ. App. 398. 8o 'S. W. 662.
Is Billings v. Morrow. 7 Cal. 171. 68 Am. Dec. 235. Same power also construed to'
the same effect in Hunter v. Sacramento Valley Beet Sugar Co., 14 Cent. L,. JOur. 3S2,
iz Fed. iS.
Nor does a power of attorney appointing one
U Coquillard v. French, ig Ind. 274.
"general and special agent to do and transact all manner. of business" necessarily confer
power upon the agent to sell bonds belnging to his- principal.. Hodge v. Combs, r
Black (U. S.) a92. Such i power, said the court. "may be construed to confer almost
any or no power."
L0roore v. Lockett, 2 Bibb (Ky.) 67, 4 Am. Dec. 683.
In Mitchell v. McLaren (Tex. Civ. App.) S1 S. W. 269. it was held that a power
of attorney "to locate any such certificate in my name or sell and assign the same," did
notempower the agent to locate land by the certificate and then to sell the land.
2;DeCordova v. Knowles. 37 Tex. ig. See also Berry v. Harnage, 39 Tex. 638,
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But where A wrote to C "I wish you to manage (my.
§ 7. property) as you would, with your'own. If a goad opportunity
offers to sell everything I have, I would be glad to sell. It may be
parties will coffe into" San Antonio, who will be glad to purchase my.
gas stock and real estate," it was held that C-was thereby -authorized
2
to contract for the sale of the real estate, but not to convey it.
to "lase" land to enable the donee of the power to extriSo
cateauthority
himself from his financial embarrassments, was held to authorize
a sale or a mortgage of the land.23 A power. "to do any lawful act
for and in my name as if24I were present" was held.to authorize a sale
and coneifyance of land.
§ 8. WHAT MAY BS SoL.-In order that the agent may lawfully.
sell any particular parcel of real estate it is, essential that that parcel
be included within the language of the power either expressly orby
clear implication. It is sometimes said that the land must be described in the power with the same certainty which would be required in the conveyance itself; and, though this may perhaps be
too strict 'a rule, it certainly is requisite that the instruments conferring the authority shall show with reasonable certainty not only
what lands are to be the subject matter of. the. power but also what
interests or estates therein are to be sold. A number of illustihations;
more or less consistent, of the actual holdings of the courts are
appended.
A power of attorney authorizing. the agent "to bargain, sell, grant,
release -and convey, and u1ion such sales,, convenient and proper
deeds with such covenants as to my said attorney shall seem expedient, in due form of law, as deed or deeds, to make, seal, deliver
and acknowledge," although it is silent as to what the agent is-to sell
and convey, clearly contemplates a sale of lands and is sufficiently
.-

where a power of attorney in the following terms was held sufficient to authorize a sale
of real estate: "to ask. demand, sue for, recover and receive all such sum and sums of
money, debts.. goods, wares, dues. accounts and other demands whatever. which are or
may be due, owing, payable, and belonging to me. or detained from me by.any manner
of ways and means whatever, in whose hands soever the same may be found; giving and
granting unto my said attorney, by these presents, my whole and full power, strength
and authority, in and about the premises, to have, use, and take all lawful ways and
means, in my name and for the purposes aforesaid, upon the receipt of any such
debts, dues or issues of money, acquittances or other sufficient discharge, for me, andin my name, to make, seal, execute deeds of conveyance and deliver, and generally
all and every act -r acts. thing or things, device or devices, in the law whatsoever
needful and necessary to be done in and about fhe premises, for me and in my 4me to

do and execute and perform." n= Lyon v. Pollock. 99 U. S. 663.
23Baker v. Byerly, 40 Mina. 489, 42 X. W. 39S.

" Veatch v. Gilmer (Tex. Civ. App. " ix

-

S. W. 746.
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broad to authorize the agent to sell and convey whatever estate the
25
principal then had.

So a power of attorney in due form, authorizing the agent "to
sell, bargain and convey three certain lots of lafid in the village of
Pentwater belonging to me," but containing no other or further
description, is sufficient where the principal had three such lots and
only three in that village ;21 but an authority "to convey a piece of
land in Colebrook belonging to the Bank," there being more than
2
one such piece is too indefinite. T
An authority to sell all the lands which the principal may own,
or all which he-may own and lying within a certain territory, is good
without a more specific description.21 And an authority to sell any
or the whole of the principal's "property" and to execute all necessary instruments authorizes the sale of his real estate. 29 Where the
lands are sufficiently described, the fact that the principal apparently
intended to add a more specific description but failed to do so, will
not defeat the power.30
§ 9. -.
A power of attorney authorizing an agent to sell
"the one-half" of a lot of land, without specifying which half, or
whether in common or in severalty, empowers him to sell one-half
in severalty and to exercise his own discretion as to which half.3

1

2 Marr v. Given, 23 Me. 5, 39 Am. Dec. 6oo. When a power of attorney executed
by a husband and wife authorizes the agent to convey any and all lands which may come
into "his" possession by reason of certain homestead entries, "his" refers to the husband
only ;nd land belonging -to them jointly or to the wife alone cannot be included. Fin.
negan v. Brown, go Minn. 396, 97 N. W. 144. A widow with one of her children executed
a writing empowering an agent to "hunt up., develop, establish and dispose of all lands
-and land claims belonging to the estate of Robert H. Wynne, deceased (her husband)
of which we are the lawful heirs:" a sale under such power conveyed the community
rights of the widow as well as the inherited interest of the daughter. The general
intent evidenced by the instrument was not required to be limited by giving the words
"of which we are lawful heirs'! their correct meaning, it being common to speak of a
widow as an "heir."
" Vaughn v. Sheridan, So Mich. xSS
"Lumbard v. Aldrich, 8 N. H. 3r, 28 Am. Dec. 381.
= Munger v. Baldridge. 41 Kan. 236. 2z Pac. '59, 13 Am. St. Rep. 273; Roper v.
McFadden. 48 CaL 346; Kane v. Sholars. 41 Tex. -Civ. App. I54, 9o S. W. 937A power to convey "all of our land in the State of North Carolina" held .a sufficient
description to admit evidence aliunde to identify. Janney v. Robbins, 14r N. C. 400,
53 S. ] . 863.

11Gardiner v. Griffith (Tex. Civ. App.) 56 S. W. ss8.
A power of attorney to sell and convey "any or all tracts, iots,
pieces or parcels
of land or real estate which have descended to, or have been acquired by, the said * * *
[plaintiff], in any of the States * * * of the United States of America, * * * excluding
therefrom all lots in the city of Omaha, State of Nebraska," is sufficient to include
lands in Pennsylvania belonging to the principal; Linton v. Moorhead, 2o09 Pa. 646,
59 At'. 264.
A power to sell and convey all the land of the principal within a certain parish is
a sufficient description; Rownd v. Davidson. 113 La. 1048, 37 So. 96s.
Bradley v. Whitesides, SSMinn. 455, 57 N. W. 148.
'Alemany v. Daly, 36 Cal. 9o.
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Where an agent is authorized to sell all the land of his principal
which the latter had not previously conveyed, he way convey what
the principal had previously sold but not conveyed :32 and under
a general authority to sell any of his principal's real estate he may sell
that which the principal subsequently acquires ;3 especially where the
power expressly refers to lands which the principal "does or may"
own." But where the power clearly contemplated the inauguration
of a business and authorized the agent to "buy and sell"- lands, it
was held that the power to sell was to be limited to lands bought
under it25 A-d, clearly, where the power is limited to land which
the rr.cipai owns or is interested in at the time of the execution of
a conveyance of subsequently acquired land is not authorthe power,
36
ized.
§ io. WHnN AUTHORITY TO il EXERCIsD.-Wheie a definite
time is fixed by the clear language of the power, any sale after that
time will be inoperative unless the principal waives the limitatioi or
ratifies the sale.37 An authoriy to sell lands at a giver sum, if they
can be sold "immediately," will not authorize a sale at that price
a month afterwards, without any further authority;38 nor can an
agent empowered to sell real estate at a given price, without further
instructions, sell it a considerable time later at the same price when
the land has greatly increased in values" An authority to an agent
to sell real estate within "a short time" will authorize a sale made
within two weeks, even though in the meantime the .property has
enhanced in value.40
WHAT EXVCUTION AuTH Riz.-An agent authorized to
§ II.
no implied
make the purchase price payable "in three years," has
'
authority to make it payable "on or before three years," "4
82Mitchell v. Maupin, 3 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) z8s.
' 3Fay v. Winchester. 4 Mete: (Mass.) 51x3. See also Benschoter v. Lalk. 24 Neb.
253, 38 N. W. 746; Benschotter v. Atkins. 2.5 Neb: 645. 4. N. W. 639.
4 Berkey v. Judd, 22 Minn. 287; Bigelow v. Livingston, 28 Minn. 57, 9 N. W. 31.
"Greve v. Coffin. 14 Minn. 345, oo Am. Dec. 229. See also Allis v. Goldsmith, 22
Minn. 123.

"5Turnerv. McDonald. 76 Cal. 177, X8 Pac. 262,. (even though the land was subsequently acquired by foreclosure of a mortgage which the principal then owned); Penfold

v. Warner. 96 Mich. 179.
T

Henry v.

Lane. 128

ss

N. W. 68o.

Fed. 243.

62 C.

C.

A.

625.

38Matthews v. Sowle, *g Neb. 398.
"5(Nine months later). Wasweyler v. Martin. 78 Wi. S9, 46 N. W. 8go; (three
years later), Proudfoot v. Wightman, 78 ILI 553. Same where six years had elapsed and the
land -had changed greatly in value and state of improvement; Hall v. "Gambrill, 88
Fed. 709.

But compare. Hartford v. McGillicuddy, 103 Me. 224, 68 Atl. 86o.

Smith v. Fairchild. 7 Colo. S10.
4%Jackson v. Badger. 35 Minn. 52, 26 N. W. 9o8; to the same effect see Dana v.
Turlay. 38 Minn. 1o6. 3S N. W. 86o; Jones v. Holladay. 2 App. D. C. 279; Coleman
v. Garrigues. x8 Barb. (N. Y.) 6o; Henry v. Lane. 128 Fed. 243. 62 C. C. A. 625, and
Monson v. Kill, r44 11. 248, 33 N. E.43.
'
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So authority to sell real estate in "lots as surveyed by" a person
named, does not empower the agent to sell the whole tract for a gross
sum or at so much per acre.4 2 And an authority to sell lands for
$5,000, one-half cash, does not authorize an agreement to sell for
$5,ooo, $2,ooo cash, $2,300 in three weeks and the balance on time ;43
nor does an authority to sell on time with interest on deferred payments authorize a sale for cash ;4" neither does an authority to make
a sale of lands for a certain amount authorize a sale in which part
of the purchase price is to be paid in cash and part on deferred
payments, the vendor to furnish an abstract of title and pay taxes
and interest thereafter accruing;45 so an authority to sell at'auction
does not authorize a'private sale; 46 nor an authoiity to sell to one
person authorize a sale to an entirely different person. 7 Further
an authority to sell for one price does not authorize a sale for. a less
amount;48 or an authority to sell, thq vendee -to pay the mortgages
does not authorize a sale, the vendee to 'assume" the mortgages
unless they are not yet due.49
. But where an agent is authoriied to sell partly for
§ 12.
cash and partly on tiie, a sale with more than one-third zash and
the balance in three and five years with 6 per cent. interest, and
secured by a mortgage is.within the ternrs of the authoy ;50 or
where the authority is to sell, the payments to be made in three equal
installments, a clause providing that if the installments are not paid
at the time specified the contract shall be forfeited at the option of
the seller is within the authority ;1 or when the agent is authoized
to convey land including a town site, he may sell a lot and make
"2Rice v. Tavernier, 8 Minn. 248, 83 Am. Dec. 78.
" De Sollar v. Hanscome, zs8 U. S. z16. ps Sup. Ct. 816; to the same effect, see,
Speer v. Craig. 16 Colo. 478. 27 Pac. 89z. Field v. Small. 17 Colo. 386, 30 Pac. 1034;
Rundle v. Cutting, x8 Colo. 337, 32 P . 994; Monson v. Kill, 144 Ill. 248, 33 N. E. -j;
Staten v. Hammer, 121 Ia. 499, 96 N. W. 964.
"Everman v. Herndon. 71 Miss. 823. 1.5 So. US:
13Staten v. Hammer. 121 Ia. 449. 96 N. W. 964; to the same effect, see, Strong .v.
Rois. .3 Ind. App. q86. 71 N. E. 918. See also Brown v. Grady, x6 Wyo. tsr, 92 PaC.
622; -Morton v. Morris, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 262, 66 S. W. 94.
"Davis v. Gordon, 87 Va. 559, 13 S. E. 35.
41Breen v. Rives, x6 App. Div. (N. Y.) 632. 44 N. Y. Supp. 672; to the same effect,
see Graves v. Horton, 38 Minn. 66, 35 N. W. 568.
"Field v. Snall. 27 Colo. 386. 3o Pac. 1-34* to the same 'effect, see, Philadelphia
Mortgage and Trust Co. v. Hardesty, 68 Kan. 683, 75 Pac. 22x2; Holbrook v. McCarthy,
6r Cal. 216; Bush v. Cole. 28 N. Y 261, 84 Am. Dec. 343; Wasweyler v. Martin. 78
Wis. 59. 46 N. W. 89o. But otherwise, where the agent is given discretion, as where he
is told that as soon as he 'was satisfied that he was getting "the top notch in wice"
he should "close the deal:" Vermont Marble Co. .v. Mead, - Vt. -, 8o Atl. 852.
41Schultz v. Griffin, 12 N. Y. 294, 24 N. E. 480, x8 Am. St. Rep. 825.
"Smith v. Keeler. iSx Ill. S18. 38 N. I. so.
51 McLaughlin v. Wheeler, i S. D. 49Y, 47 N. W. 816.
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the conveyance by metes and bounds ;52 also-wtere he is authorized
to make "one-half payable on or before one year" a contract to sell
for "one-half payable- in one year" is within the terms. of the
authorization

;r,

and where the authority is to sell for $15,OOO, about

one-half cash, a sale for $I5,OOO cash is within the terms of the
authority. '
Under a power to convey when the sale has been made by certain
other persons, a conveyance can only effectively be made when those
-persons have made the sale. 55
§ 13. AUTHORITY TO MAKI RiEm SNTATIONS. As To V.Luz,
QUANTITY, LOCATION, BOUNDAIE S OR TITZ.-An agent authorized
merely to sell land has thereby, ordinarily, no implied power to bind
his principal by representations concerning the value of the land;5"
the same thing is ordinarily true concerning representations as to the
quantity, or quality of the.land, though such representations, while
not furnishing ground for action against the principal, might be
sufficient to justify a rescission of the contract.5 7 Representations as
to location may be within the scope of such an agent's authority
.as being either necessary or usuall8 and the same thing may be true
respecting boundaries. In a casi of the latter sort it was said: "In
the sale or exchange of a tract of land, it is usual and nedessary that
the seller point out to the prospective.buyer the boundaries of the
tract-that he exhibit the thing he offers for sale to the view and
inspection of the prospective buyer."59
Representations respecting title, other than the usual covenants of
warranty, heretofore referred to, or waivers of the principal's claim
of title are not usually within the power of an agent merely authorized to sell.00
. Jones v, Gibbs. I8 Te. Civ. App. 626, 46 S. W. 73. See similarly. Anthony v.
City of Providence, I8 R. J. 699, v8 At]. 766.
" Deakin v. Underwood, 37 Minn. 98, S Am. St. Rep. 827.
"WitherelU v. Murphy, 147 Mass. 417, I8.N. ]. zS.
"Deputron v. Young, 134 U. S. 24!, zo Sup. Ct. 539.
USee, Mayo v. Wahlgreen, 9 Colo. App. So6, So Pac. 40; Sanford v.- Handy, 23
Wend. (N. Y.) 26o; Lake v. Tyree. 90 Va. 719, 19 S. 1. 7P7 (that lots were "good
building lots and valuable.")'
"Nat. Iron Armor Co. v. Bruner. sg N. 3. Eq. 331; Bennett v. Judson, 2! N. Y.
238; McKinnon v. Vollmar. 75 Wis. 82. 43 N. W. 8oo. An agent authorized to sell
has no authority to make reresentations as to a foundation wall. Samson v. Beale, 27
Wash. SS7. 68 Pac. x8o. No rescission if there was. no agency: Reeves v. McCracken,
Tex. --. xa8 S. W. 89s.
" See. Sanford v. Handy. dupra; McKinnon v. Vollmar, supra; Porter v.
Beattie, 88 Wi&s. 2 9 N. W. 499.
Green v. Worman. 83 Mo. App. S68.
eTondro v. Cushman, s Wis. 279; Iowa R. 11. Land Co. v. Fehring; x26 Iowa 7,
lax N. W. 2o.
So an agent authorized to sell has no'authority to promise that the buyer shall
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CONTRACT OF SALE JUSTIfIES CON-

TRACT iN UsuAL FORM.-An authority to iake a binding contract

for the sale of land will, where .there is nothing to indicate a contrary
intention, carry with it by implication the authority to make the contract in the usual form and to include within it all usual and reasonable terms and provisions to accomplish the desired end. - Thus the
common provisions in well drawn contracts of this nature respecting
remedies, time and place of performance, the effect of failure to
perform, and the like, would doubtless be deemed authoriz d under

this rule.6'
§ 15. AUTHORITY.TO SELL AND DISPOsE oF LAND IMPLIES RIGHT
TO CoNvzy.-Unless there be something in the instrument or in the
circumstances surrounding its execution by which its scope is limited,
as to the mere finding of a purchaser or the negotiation of a contract
of sale, a general power to sell real estate if executed with the necessary formalities, carries with it the power to execute all the instruments necessary to complete the sale and carry it into effect. 2 Said
Chief Justice SHAw,"'where the term"sale' is used in its oidinary
sense, and the general tenor and effect of the instrument is to confer
on the attorney a power to dispose of- real estate, the authority. to
execute the proper instruments required by law to carry such sale

into effect is necessarily incident."0 3
It is, of course, true-in many cases, that an oral or written authority may be sufficient to justify a written contract to sell, although it
have a privilege to pass over adtjoininz land. owned by his principal, or that such land
will not be fenced. Noftsger v. Barkdoll, x48 Ind. 531, 47 N. X. 96o.
But where -the vendor refers the vendee to his local agent as one acquainted -with
land and equipped to explain its qualities and the agent in so doing misfepresents, it
was held a ground for rescission. A sale of coal lands. Mather v. Barnes, 146 Fed. 1oo.
0 See Kilpatrick v. Wiley, 107 Mo. 123" 95 S. W. 2z3. But in Funk v. Church &
Fitzgerald. sxe Iowa x, iog N. W. 286. an agent authorized to sell, made an agreement to
reimburse the pilrchaser if he lost a half of the land and it was held that the power to
make such a contract %as not to be implied.
e Valentine v. Piper. 22 Pick. (Mass.) 8S. 33 Am. Dec. 715 ; Hemstreet v. Burdick,
90 Ill. 444; People v. Boring, 8 Cal. 406; Fogarty v. Sawyer, 17 Cal. 589; Marr v. Given,
53 Me. 5. 39 Am. -Dec. 6on; Alexander v. Walter, 8 Gill (Md.) 239, 5o A-in. Dec. 688;
Farnham v. Thompson. .4 Minn. 330. 26 N. W. 9; Delanb v. Jaroby, 96 Cal. 275, 31
Pa. 290. Of these ca ge;, 8 Cal. 406, and 8 Gill 239 were official sales;.x7 Cal. s89, was
a. s4e under a power ctfnferred by mortgage; the others were sales under formal. powers
,of attoi'ney, all apparently, under seal.
U In Valentine v. Piper, supra.
A person entrusted with a deed for the purpose of getting the grantor's silknatures
and then delivering it is clothed with at least apparent authority "to close the deal"
on their part: Bretz v. Connor, 140 Wis. 269, 122 N. V. 717.
Secret instructions as to the conditions upon which a deed is to be delivered do not
bind purchaser who has no notice of them; Thornton v. Pinckard, 157 Ala. 2o6, 47 So.
289.

HeinOnline -- 10 Mich. L. Rev. 271 1911-1912

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

would not be sufficient in form, as for example because of the lack
of a seal, to authorize the execution of a deed.
§ x6. To INSERT UsUAL COVENANTS OF WARRANTY.-Although
the decisions are not entirely harmonious, the better rule seems to be
that a general power to sell and convey land carries with it authority
to insert in the conveyance the ordinary covenants of general6 warranty where such sales are usually niade with such covenants, ' but
not to make any unusual or special warranty, as of the quantity or
quality of the land sold." A fortiori may the agent warrant where
he is expressly authorized to sell on such terms as he shall deem most
eligible.66
The fact that the agent inserts an unauthorized warranty will not
ordinaiily prevent the deed from having effect as a conveyance.67

§ 17. AUTHORITY TO SELL DoEs NOT JUSTIFY A MORTGAGE.-A 68
power to sell, however, conveys no implied authority to mortgage.
Said Judge CooLEY, "The principal determines for himself what
authority he will confer upon his agent, and there can .be no implication frlm his authorizing a sale of his lands that he intends that
charge him with the responsibilities and
his agent may at discretion
duties of a mortgagor."09
PAYMENT.-The receipt of so
§ I8: AUTHORITY io "RECa
much of the purchase money as is to be paid down, is within the 'gen70
eral scope of an authority to sell aud convey, or to make a binding
contract to sell upon terms including a payment at the time of the
execution of.the contract, but is held not to be within the power of
"Vanada t. Hopkins. x J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 28S. xg Am. Dec. 9,;.Peters v. FarnsIS Vt. 15$, 4o Am. Dec. 671; Le Roy v. Beard, 8 How. (U.S.) 4S:; Backman v.
330; Dinmick v. Sprinkel,
Charlestown. 42 N. . X2a; Farnham v. Thompson, 34 Mi.
59 Wash. 329. tog Pac. xox8; McLaughlin v. Wheeler. I S. I).. 497, 47 .N. W. 8x6;
Schultz V. Griffin, 1X N. Y- "294, 24 N.. E. 480, x8 Am. St. Rep. 8a$. Same rule applies
to an authority'to mortgage; Richmond v. Voorhees. 1o Wash. 316, 38 Pac. 1014. See
also Bronson v. Coffi, it8 Mass. 4S6; C. Yazel v. Palmer, 88 Ill. 597. Contra: Stengel
v. Sergeant, 74 N. 3. Eq. 2o, 68 At. xx6.
-National Iron Armor Co. v. Bruner, 19.N. J. Eq. 331.
"Le Roy v. Beard. supra.
Tem. Civ. App. i$4. go S. W. 937.
U .ane v. Sholars, 4
"Jeffrey v. Rursh, 49 Mich. 31; Wood v. Goodridge, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 117, s2 Am.
Dec. 77z; 41bany Fire Ins. Co. v. Bay. 4 N. Y. 9; Ferry v. Laible, 3 N. J. Eq. s66;
Kinney v. Matheis, 69 Mo. So; Patapsco, etc. Co. v. Morrison, 2 Woods (U. S. C. C.)
395; Devaynes v. Robinson. a4 Beav. 86; Morris v. Watson: x Minn.. 212; Minnesota
Stoneware Co. v. McCrossen' "ito Wis. 316. 85 N. W. zozg; Campbell v. Foser Home
Association. i63 Pa. St. 6og. 3o Atl. 222. 26 L. R. A. x7; Salem Nat. Bank v. White.
1s59 IlL 136. 42 N. E 312; Morris v. Ewing. 8 N. Dak. 99, 76 N. VW. 1047; First Nat.
Bank v. Hicks. se, Te-. Civ. App. 269, 59 S. W. 842.
/
Inin Jeffrey v. Hursh, supra.
'Pecl
v. Harriott. 6. Serg. '& R. (Penn.)'146. 9Am. Dec. 415; Carson v. Smith.
S Minn. 78. 77 Am. bec. S39; Mann v. Robinson, 19 W. Va. 49, 42 Am. Rep. 771;
Alexander v. Jones, 64 Iowa. 207; Yerbey v. Grigsby. 9 Leigh (Va.) 387; Johnson v.
McGruder, IS Mo..365;.Goodale v. Wheeler, ir N. H. 424.

worth,
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an agent authorized merely by parol to contract for .the sale."1 Mere
authority to receive the. immediate payment'will not,. however, warrant the receipt of subsequent payments. 72 But an agent authorized

to contract for the sale with the price to be paid-in installments, and
upon payment of the installments to execute the conveyance, has implild power to receive the installments."8
When authorized to receive payment he must, like other agents
similarly empowered, accept cash only or its equivalent, and he has

no implied power to receive in payment notes, checks, or other similar
tokens, 7 and a fortiori not notes given by himself for which the
principal is not responsible.7" Authority to receive such payments as
are to be made as incidents of the sale does not justify the receipt
of payments before any sale is entered inio, and, obviously, does not
justify the receipt of payments'upon a contract which the agent had
.no authority to make. 70
§ -19. CONVEYANCe: MUST BZ FOR
PRINCiPAL.-An

CONSIDERATION

MOVING TO

agent authorized to sell and convey land will, unless

the contrary appears, be deemed authorized to coinvey it only upon a
s~le, that is, upon a transfer for a consideration, and for a consideration which moves to the principal.7 The land presumptively repren Smith v. Browne. 132 N. C. 365. 43 S. B. gis; Dyer v.
Duffy, 39 W. Va. x48,
See also Mann v. Robinson, supra; Stewart v. Wood, 63 Mo. 252.
WVhere one of three tenants in common was given parol
authority to sell land and in
the presence of the other two, the deeds were made out; and one of the parties
delivered
them to the purchaser in the presence of the one acting as agent and in the
absence
of thg other and the purchaser -paid him his share of the money and paid to
the agent
the remainder, the agent being expressly directed not to receive it, it was held
that the
third tenant in common could recover her share of the price of the purchaser,
because
an authority to an agent to make a contract of sale, does not necessarily give an
authority
to receive payment; Shaw v. Williams, o0 N. C. 27.2, 6 S. B. r96. A fortiori;
a broker
who has mere authdrity to bring the parties together has no authority to receive payment; Halsell v. Renfrow, 14 Oki. 674, 78 Pac. 1x8.
o
Mann's Zx'r's v. Robinson. x6 W. Va. 49, 42 Am. Rep. 77x. See Johnson v.
Craig. 21 Ark. 5.
Of course, the agent's authority .over the matter of the sale of his
principal's land may be so general as to give him power to receive payments
a, any
time, or waive defaults in paying at the time fixed: McDonald v. Kingsbury.
CaL
App. -, 116 Pac. 380.
1 Peck v. Harriott, supra; Carson v. Smith, supra.
7' Ormsby v. Graham. 123 Iowa 202. 98 N. W. 724; Wilkin
v. Voss, 1ao Iowa $oo.
94 N. W. 123; Runyon v. Snell, sr6 Ind. 164, z8 N. B. 522. But compare C
lbraith v.
Weber, S8 Wash. 132, x07 Pac. xo5o, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 341.
7 Runyon v. Snell, supra.
" Schaeffer v. Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co., 38 Mont. 459, xoo Pac. 223; Brown v. Grady,
x6 Wyo. 1SZ, 92 Pac. 622 (receipt of earnest money upon an unauthorized contract
does
not bind principal); Jackson v. Badger, 35 Minn. 32, 26 N. W. 9o8 (same).
' Alcorn v. Buschke. 133 Cal. 6.5S. 66 Pac. is; Hunter v. Eastham, 95 Tex.
648.
69 S. W. 66. In Neill'v. Kleiber, Si Tex. Civ. App. 532, I12 S. W. 694, a power
to sell
and "to do with the said land as if the :.ame were his own property." was
held to
authorize a sale on credit for the agent's own benefit.
i9

S. F. 540.
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sents value and if the agent conveys it, he must be expected to obtain
75
something like a substantial equivalent.
§ 20. AUTHORITY TO Givx CRZT.-The power to sell land does
not of itself imply an authority to sell on credit. The presumption is
that the sale is to be for cash.7 9 But where the agent is authorized
to sell "on such terms as to him shall seem meet" he may grat a
reasonable credit. 80 An authority to sell on credit, but not fixing the
8
time to be gi,,en, implies a power to grant a reasonable time. '
§ 21. AUTHORIfY TO S=L DoEs NOT AUTHORIZn EXCHANGE OR
BARTER.-Neither will a power to sell and convey -land, imply an
authority to barter or exchange it for other property, 'or to'take the
pay in merchandise. It is. presumed, in the absence of anything
showing a contrary intent, that the land is to be sold only, and s6ld
for cash.8
. OR Gi .- A fortiori has the agent no authority to
§ 22.
IsHunter v. Xastham. gs Tex. 648, 69 S. W.'66; Lewis v. Lewis.'203 Pa. £94, S2
AtL 203; Alcorn v. Buschke, 133 Cal. 65S, 66 Pac. xs.
TLumpkin *v. Wilson, s Heisk, (Tenn.)' sss; to the same effect, see Alcorn v.
tieseke, xs8 Cal. 396, zzx Pac. 98; Lightfoot v. Horst, - Tem. -.- 32 S. W. 6r; Bowles
1z2 S..W.
v. Rice, 1o7 Va. St, i7 S. Z. S7S; Mcay v. McKinnon, - Tex. Civ. App.
Civ. 'APp.) 79 S. W. 48; Staten v.
(Tex.
44o; Edwards v. Davidson.
Hammer, 1z Iowa, 499. 96 N. W. 964; Dyer v. Duffy, 39 Wo Va: z48,' 19 S. E. 54o;
and, as a matter of course, where the power of attorney itself authorizes ofily a sale for
cash. a sale on credit may be treated as void by the principal; Whitley v. James. 1.2
Ga..$zi, 49 S. i. 600.
The power will be strictly construed. - A power to sell for cash at'any time within
30 days, will not justify giving a credit for not more than 3o days; Bowles v. Rice.
supra:
' Carson v. Smith. s Minn. 78. 77 Am. Dec. 539.
In Morton v.korris, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 262, 66 S. W. 94, the agent was given
authority to sellon such terms as "to him shall. seem meet." He sold the land and
took- as part of the consideration a non-negotiable note not due until one year after the
removal of an attachment lien whieh the purchaser was interested in and of which the
owner had no notice. The court said: "Were it not for the fact that it [the power],
empowers the agent" to sell on such terms as to him shall seem meet. "there could be
no implication that authority was to sell on credit, but the presumption would be that the
* *
sale should be for cash. As it is he was authorized to sell on reasonable credit.
Is twelve months after * * * the ending of a lawsuit a reasonable credit to be given by
an agent for the payment of ihe purchase money due for the sale of his principal's
property? As a matter of law, we think not."
$I Brown v."Cihtal Lbnd Co., 42 "Cal. 257.
0 Reese v. MedloCk. .27 T ex. 120. 84 Am. Dec. 611; Trudo v. Anderson. to Mich.
357, 8x Am. Dec. 79.5;Mann v. Robinson. 19 W . Va: 49, 42 Am. Rep. !F77; Lumpkin
v. Wilson,. S Heisk. (Tenn.) .sss;'Rhine v. Blake, 59 Tex. 24o; Morrill v. Cone, 22 How.
(U. S.) ys; Hampton v. M5oorhead, 62 Iowa, 91; Dupont-v. Werthenian, to Cal. 3S4;
Mott v. Smith. x6 Cal. S33; Paul v. Grimm. 16S Pa. 139, 30 At. 721, £83 Pa. 326. 38
AtL 1017; Mora v. Murphy, 83 Cal. 12, 23 Pac. 63; Chapman v. Hughes, 134 Cal. 641,
S8 Pac. 298. 6o Pac. 974; Xdwards v. Davidson, (Tex. Civ. App.), 79 S. NV. '48;
Kempner v. Rosenthal. 8z Tex. 12. x6 S. -W. 639.
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give the land away or to convey it without any consideration moving
to the principal.8
§ 23. AUTHORITY TO SaL Dozs NT AuTHORizz OPTIoN To
Buy.-An agent with aiithority to. sell has, thereby, no implied
authority to give an option to biy. Such option, will, during its -tern,
prevent a sale to any other person, and 2isale to the one Holding the
option will not be insured."
§ 24. Does NOT AUTHORIZ4 WAST4 OR SATxZO TImBeR SEPAR-

.--An agent or attorney who has power only to barATE rRom LA
gain and sell land subject to confirmation, has no authority to license
timber, nor has he
anyone to enter thereon and commit waste or cut
85
land.
the
from
distinct
power to sell the timber
§ 25.

DoEs NOT AUTHORIZE CHANGING BOUInARES or LAND.-

*Nor has an agent authorized to sell or rent real estate any implied
owner upon a change of the
power to agree with an adjoining 8land
6
land.
principal's
the
of
'boundaries
§ 26.

Does NOT AUTHORIZE PARTITIoN-Authority to sell and

convey land does not authorize a partition of the land in which the
principal has an interest as tenant in common.81

§ 27.

DoEs NOT AUTHORIZE DEDICATION TO PUBLIC Us.-Mere

authority to sell and convey land does not imply power to dedicate
any part of it to the public use ;88 but a power "to sell, convey, plat
and subdivide in such manner as to make the property marketable
to dedicate
and to acknowledge and record such plat" implies a 8power
9
such portion as may be necessary to -the public use. So a .power to
lay out land in order to dispose of it, implies authoity to dedicate
the necessary highways, 0 and authority to purchase a town site and
91
lay it out, implies power to dedicate proper and appropriate streets.
=In Randall v. Duff, 79 Cal. xxs, xg Pac. 532, it was conceded that where the
authority was to sell, a conveyance by way of gift passed no title but that a bona fide
mortgagee of the donee had a valid lien upon the land to the extent of his money advanced; and in Van Zandt v. Furlong. IS N. Y. Supp. 54 (63 Hun 63o), it was held
that although the attorney with mere authority to.sell could not make a valid transfer
without valuable consideration, yet a subsequent purchaser from the transferee'could not
recover back his consideration by offerin* to prove that the prior conveyance had been
made by an agent with mere authority to sell and had, in fact, been made without consideration.
"Field v. Small. 17 Colo. 386. 30 Pac. 1034; Tibba v. Zirkle, SS W. Va. 49, 46
S. F. 702. See also Dyer v. Duffy, 39 W. Va. 148, 19 S. B. 540.
=Hubbard v. Xlmer, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 446, 22 Am. Dec. 59o;'St. Louis S. W. Ry.
Co. of Texas v. Bramlette (Tex. Civ. App.), 35 S. W. 2.
"Fore v. Campbell. Sr-Va. oS, I S. V. ISo.
8?Borel v. Rollins. so Cal. 408; Wirt v. 24cfnery. 2x Fed. 233.
*Wirt v. Mc~nery, at Ped. 233; Gosseln v. Chicago, 103 Ill.633; Anderson v.
Bigelow, x6 Wash. x98, 47 Pac. 426.
* Wirt v. Mclnery, supra.
"State v. Atherton, z6 N. H. 203.
' Bartea= v. West. 23 Wis. 416.
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28.

VEYANCE

AUTHORITY
TO

PAY

TO

SELL DOES

PRINCIPAL'S

NOT
OR

DEBTS,

AUTHORIZE
ASSIGNMENT

CONFOR

CREDITORS.--The power to sell land does not authorize a conveyance

in settlement of a pre-existing claim against the principal,9 2 nor an
assignment for the benefit of creditors.9 3 But where the authority
was tb-sell the land and pay the proceeds to the principal's creditor,
it was held that a conveyance directly to the creditor was within the
terms of the power."
§ 29. NOR CONVEYANCE IN PAYMENT OF AGENT'S. DEBT.-An
agent authorized to sell and convey real estate can do so only for and
in behaJf of his principal. He may not convey it in trust for the
payment of his own debts ;95 nor can he make the conveyance directly,
for the payment of his own debt, or the joint debt of himself and one
of his principals. 99

§ 30. NOR CONVEYANCE IN TRUST VOR SUPPORT OF PRINCIPAI'S CHILD.-A wife was authorized to sell or mortgage land as

agent of her husband. It was held that a conveyance in trust for the
support of their infant daughter was not within the authority given
by the power. 7 Neither can she convey it in satisfaction of advances
made to her by their son.08
§ 3. No IMPLIED POWER TO REVOKE OR ALTER CONTRACT.-An
agent authorized to make a dontract for the sale of land exhausts his
power with the completion of that contract; and has thereafter no
implied power to revoke or rescind it, or to release the purchaser
from its obligations. - So an agent who has made a contract to sell
0 SWrrin v. O'Brien, "43 Te. Civ. App. x, 95 S. W. 696.
'Frost v. Erath Cattle Co.. 8 Te. 505, 17 S. W. 52; Gouldy v. Metcalf, 7S Tex.
3d.
45S, 12 S. W.
' Neither does it authorize a conveyance in satisfaction of a debt which has been
Smith v. Powell, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 373, 23 S. W.
barred by the statute of limitations.
txog. Nor does an authority to one of several co-heirs to sell a piece of real estate, authorize a conveyance of it in satisfaction of a judgment against such heir and his mother;
Folts v. Perguson, (Tem. Civ. App.), 24 S. W. 65;. But.where the agent had a partnership interest in the land, and had the complete management and. control of it, it was
held that a cohvejance by him in consideration of a cancellation of the partnership notes
was authorized. Kempner v. Rosenthal, 81 Tex. 12, 16 S. W. 639. And where the
authority was "to make a sale or other disposition of the" property, and "to execute

all deeds," etc., it was held that a conveyance to an attorney for legal services in locating and establishing a town site on the land, was within the terms of the power. Jones
v. Gibbs, %8Tem. Civ. App. 626, 46 S. W. 73.
04 Bertschy v. Bank of Sheboygan, 89 Wis. 473, 61 N.

W. ziis.

"9Frink v. Roe, 70 Cal. -96, xi Pac. 82o; Runyon v. Snell, x16 Ind. x64.
" Hunter v. Easthan. 9,q Te=.
Civ. App.), 81 S. W. 336.

648. 69 S. W.

t

66.

Same case came up again (Tea.

' Coulter v. Portland Trust Co.. 20 Or. 469, 26 Pac. s6..

Same case, 23 Or. 131.

31 Pac. 280.
" Lewis v. Lewis, 2o3 Pa. %94, 52 AtL 2o3.

'Luke
12o N.

v. Grigg, (Dak), 3o N. W. 1o7; West End Hotel & Land Co. v. Crawford,

C. .47. 27 S. E. 31.
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and received a part payment thereon, has no implied power to return
the money because he is erroneously led to believe that the principal's

title was imperfect. 10 0
Such an agent will, moreover, have ordinarily no power to change
10
or alter the completed contract or to substitute'another in its place, '
though his authority over the subject matter ma, be gufficiently
I
comprehensive to justify it2

§

32.

No

IMPLIED POWER To DISCHARGE MORTGAGE.-An

agent

authorized merely to sell land has therefrom no implied power to

release or discharge mortgages belonging to his principal;103 but
an agent having general authority to deal in land, may bind his prinby the assumption of a mortgage as part of the purchase
cipal 1°4
price.
§ 33. No IMPLIED POWER TO INVEST PROCEEDS.- A power of

attorney authorizing the agent to take possession of and sell all the
property of his principal, and collect his debts, does not authorize
the agent to re-invest the funds of his principal or to engage there10 5
with in any schemes of speculation, however tempting.
MECHEM.
R.
FLOYD
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.
'0Montgomery v. Pacific Coast Land Bureau, 94 Cal. 284, 29 Pac. 640.
2nIn Hill v. Bess (Tex. Civ. App.). 40 S. W. 202. it was held that a mere
authority to sell lands and collect payments does not authorize the agent, after deed has
been given, and purchase money notes have been sent to the vendor, to take new notes
in substitution (which the agent wrongfully retained and appropriated), though" the
agent erroneously supposed the first notes had miscarried in the mails.
'"Thus in Francis v. Litchfield, 82 Iowa 726, 47 N. W. 998, it was held that where
one had general authority to sell the lands of a non-resident principal, and collect the
payments. le had implied authority to make a contract with a purchaser whereby he
was to take a second mortgage on the land instead of a first mortgage, in consideiation
that the purchaser would make a part payment out of the proceeds of the first mortgage
and give some additional security. There was also evidence of ratification.
06Barger v. Miller, 4 Wash. (U. S. C. C.) 280.
106Schley v. Fryer, 1oo N. Y. 71."
&
'&Stoddart v. United States. 4 Ct. Ci. sM . See Porges v. U.'S. Mortgage
Trust Co., 13S App. Div. 484, 12o N. Y. Supp. 487, where a power to sell was accompanied by express power to use proceeds in effecting a redemption of mortgaged
land; it was held that theagent could convert proceeds of a sale in the form of a check
payable to his principal into cash and deposit the same in his individual banking account.
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